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I. Introduction
The Second Circuit's 2010 ruling in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The author is deeply
appreciative of the guidance and revisions generously offered by Professor William
Dodge, Eric Hager, Rachel Parker, William Parker and, especially, Professor
Chimbne Keitner. All errors and omissions are the author's own.
In the interest of full disclosure, the author and Editorial Board would like to note
after the final revisions of this Article were made, but before publication, the author
provided pro-bono legal assistance to the plaintiffs' attorneys in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Shell Petro. Co., which is discussed in this Article.
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Petroleum Co.' sent shockwaves through the human rights
community. The three-judge panel, led by Judge Jos6 Cabranes,
unexpectedly ruled to exclude corporations from jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 2 despite the fact that neither party had
briefed the issue.' Since the mid-1990s, the Alien Tort Statute has
been the primary legal mechanism for attempting to hold
corporations responsible in United States courts for their complicity
in the violations of international human rights around the world. As
part of the original Judiciary Act passed by the first Congress in 1789,
the ATS establishes jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear actions
in tort, brought by aliens, for violations of the law of nations.' Early
ATS cases primarily consisted of suits against former dictators,
generals, and other state actors involved in genocides, torture, and
extrajudicial killings. More recently, however, human rights
practitioners, bolstered by a burgeoning international corporate
accountability movement, began recognizing the statute's potential
use in cases against corporations that often hold as much if not more
power than states in the facilitation of human rights violations.
In the late 1990s, shortly after the Second Circuit found certain
non-state actors subject to jurisdiction of the ATS in the case Kadic v.
Karadzic,6 the international human rights community began filing
suits against corporations. Since then, victims of human rights abuses
from all over the world have brought dozens of ATS cases against the
corporations that facilitated or supported the perpetration of those
abuses in violation of international law. While monetary awards
against individual ATS defendants have unfortunately been largely
1. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
2. Alien Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; the statute is also referred to
commonly as the "Alien Tort Claims Act" (ATS).
3. Kiobel, 621 F.3d 119 (majority opinion) (justifying the court's interpretation
of corporations as excluded from ATS jurisdiction, the majority states, "The principle
of individual liability for violations of international law has been limited to natural
persons - not 'juridical' persons such as corporations - because the moral
responsibility for a crime so heinous and unbounded as to rise to the level of an
'international crime' has rested solely with the individual men and women who have
perpetrated it.") (emphasis added).
4. Id. at 115-16.
5. Paul Hoffman, Lecture at University of California, Hastings College of the
Law (Mar. 28, 2011).
6. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding Radovan Karadzic, the self-proclaimed
president of Srpska, liable under the ATS even though he was considered a non-state
actor because the Bosnian-Serb entity was unrecognized as a state).
2 [Vol. 35:1
2012] Applying the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility to Corporate Officers
uncollectable, a few plaintiffs have negotiated substantial money
settlements from corporate defendants.' Beyond monetary redress,
ATS litigation provides plaintiffs with symbolic vindication and
empowerment while serving as a deterrent against future corporate
complicity in international law violations.!
The Kiobel ruling, if upheld or followed by the Supreme Court
this upcoming term,9 would erase this avenue of redress and
significantly limit the ability of victims of human rights violations to
seek civil remedies in the United States under the ATS.o Since
victims typically have no other feasible domestic or international
venues to bring their claims against corporations, excluding
corporations from ATS jurisdiction could preclude any redress for
victims of these atrocious crimes. Judge Leval, in his stirring dissent
in Kiobel, wrote,
Without any support in either the precedents or the scholarship of
international law, the majority take the position that corporations,
and other juridical entities, are not subject to international law, and
for that reason such violators of fundamental human rights are free
to retain any profits so earned without liability to their victims ...
So long as they incorporate (or act in the form of a trust),
businesses will now be free to trade in or exploit slaves, perform
genocides or operate torture prisons for a despot's political
opponents, or engage in piracy-all without civil liability to
victims.
While Judge Leval's comments certainly speak to the chilling
effect of the majority's holding, Judge Cabranes and the majority did
provide a sliver of hope for victims of human rights abuses. The
majority specifically left open the possibility to sue individuals for the
7. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001), Wiwa v. Shell, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11873 (2d Cir.) (June 3, 2009), Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d
Cir. 2009).
8. Chimine I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64 (2008).
9. 621 F. 3d 111, cert. granted, 2011 WL 4905479 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-
1491). See also Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011)
and Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Nos. 09-7125, 09-7127, 09-7134, 09-7135, 2011 WL
2652384 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011) (finding that corporations are not immune from ATS
liability).
10. See John B. Bellinger III, Will Federal Court's Kiobel Ruling End Second
Wave of Alien Tort Statute Suits, 25 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 3 (2010) (predicting how
the current Supreme Court would rule if it were to hear Kiobel).
11. 621 F.3d at 150 (Leval, J., dissenting).
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violations of corporations, stating, "[N]othing in this opinion limits or
forecloses suits under the ATS against the individual perpetrators of
violations of customary international law- including the employees,
managers, officers, and directors of a corporation." 2 But how? If
Kiobel remains the law in the Second Circuit or is adopted by the
Supreme Court in the future, how can victims of human rights abuses
attach liability to the "individual men and women who have
perpetrated [them]"?
The answer is unclear. Each potential avenue to attach liability
to individuals for corporate complicity presents its own set of knotty
obstacles. To begin with, victims have and will continue to face
severe obstacles to achieving any level of success in suits against the
actual perpetrators of the underlying human rights violation. Most
glaringly, foreign torturers, mercenaries, and dictators very rarely
have the requisite presence in United States territory that would
allow for personal jurisdiction. Additional fundamental hurdles
include the Act of State Doctrine, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act or common law immunity, the political question doctrine, and
forum non conveniens, to name a few. Even if a plaintiff can obtain
jurisdiction and avoid all of the above legal obstacles, the actual
perpetrators of the crimes usually do not have the personal assets
with which to satisfy a judgment. ATS suits against corporations
gained traction chiefly because plaintiffs could avoid running into
some of the above roadblocks.
As such, Kiobel would deprive human rights victims of the
primary tool currently utilized in the efforts to seek justice and
reparations for grave crimes facilitated by corporate involvement.
Kiobel thus raises the stakes for developing a theory of individual
liability for corporate actors. Even if Kiobel were overturned, any
additional mechanism that could hold liable the individuals
responsible for the corporation's illicit conduct would maintain
substantial value to victims as an alternative theory of liability. This
Article presents the doctrine of superior responsibility as a functional
theory of liability to fill some of the gaps potentially left by Kiobel, or
to add another arrow to the quiver if the Supreme Court reverses
Kiobel.
Part 1I lays out the basic concept behind holding corporate
officers responsible under the doctrine of superior responsibility and
12. Id. at 122 (majority opinion).
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provides a brief policy discussion on the merits of superior
responsibility in the corporate context." In Part III, the fundamental
principles of superior responsibility are reviewed through a
chronology of the doctrine's development from World War II
tribunals to the ad hoc tribunals up to more recent cases in United
States courts. Part IV touches on the threshold choice of law issues
that plague ATS litigation and some of the theoretical problems that
arise in transferring international criminal law into actions in tort.
Part V analyzes the principles of superior responsibility as specifically
applied to corporate officers under an ATS suit. In conclusion, this
Article revisits the policy arguments in favor of holding individual
corporate officers liable and highlights some areas of business activity
most vulnerable to suit under the theory.
II. Superior Responsibility as an Alternative Theory of Liability
[Clommunity, or its rulers, may be held responsible for the crime of
a subject if they know of it and do not prevent it when they could
and should prevent it.
- Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis: Libri
Tres4
Broadly speaking, the doctrine of superior responsibility imposes
liability on superiors when they know or should have known about
their subordinates' violations of international law, but fail to prevent
such acts or punish the perpetrators." Thus, as adopted by the
United States courts, for superior responsibility to apply, a superior-
subordinate relationship must exist in which the defendant has
effective authority and control over the person or persons who
committed the human rights abuses." Notably, unlike aiding and
abetting liability, superiors are not charged with assisting the crimes
13. The doctrine is also known as "command responsibility." The term "superior
responsibility" will be used in this paper in line with the language used in the Statutes
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). See J.D. Levine, The Doctrine
of Command Responsibility and its Application to Superior Civilian Leadership: Does
the International Criminal Court have the Correct Standard?, 193 MIL. L. REV. 52, 53
n.8 (2003) for a more thorough account of the terminology's development.
14. HUGo GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI ACPACIS: LIBRI TRES (1625), Bk. III, ch. XI,
§§ v-vii (Carnegie trans., 537).
15. See, e.g., Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir.
2002); see also Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 499 (6th Cir. 2009).
16. Ford, 289 F.3d at 1288.
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of their subordinates, but rather with failing to carry out their duty as
superiors to prevent or punish the criminal conduct of their
subordinates or persons under their control." In this sense, superior
responsibility should be viewed as an accompanying alternative
theory to aiding and abetting liability, as opposed to a stand-alone
replacement.
Still, despite its limits, superior responsibility is attractive to
plaintiffs as compared to other attributive conduct theories against
individuals for its definitive "knew or should have known" mens rea
standard. While both the customary international law standard and
the federal common law standard for aiding and abetting require only
a "knowledge" mens rea, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., decided by the same Second Circuit panel as Kiobel, put
that standard in doubt." The international standard adopted by the
Second Circuit, derived from the Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, requires a mens rea of "purpose"
for the defendant's complicit conduct in aiding and abetting human
rights violators. 9 Compared to the United States federal standards as
well as the customary international law standards derived from the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals and developed by the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda,20 the "shared purpose" requirement imposes an extremely
high threshold for plaintiffs to meet. Thus, in certain jurisdictions
superior responsibility might feasibly succeed in cases where the
"shared purpose" mens rea requirement of Talisman makes aiding
and abetting suits logistically unnavigable because of the high burden
of proof. 21
17. "It should also be noted that superior responsibility is not limited to crimes
physically committed by subordinates but encompasses any modes of individual
criminal responsibility including aiding and abetting." INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
OF JURISTS, 2 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS EXPERT
LEGAL PANEL ON CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: CRIMINAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 32 (2008), available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/
Volume_2.pdf [hereinafter ICJ REPORT] (citing Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No.
IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 171 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia [ICTY] Sept. 17, 2003)).
18. 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
20. See Norman Farrell, Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate Actors, 8 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 873 (2010).
21. This might not be the case if the court adopted the new International
Criminal Court (ICC) standard, discussed infra in Part II(D), which requires a more
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The principal benefit of placing a duty on superiors to prevent
the commission of atrocities is its deterrence function.22 Corporate
officers and employees may be more cautious regarding action or
decisions that might lead to human rights violations, and more
vigilant in preventing or remedying those crimes, if liability can be
traced directly back to the individuals. Especially due to the dangers
inherent in leaving Kiobel and Talisman in place, the law should
encourage some modicum of corporate social responsibility rather
than providing a shield to enable what is oftentimes reckless disregard
for international law and standards of decency, while at the same time
advancing the ethic of corporate pursuit of profit at all costs.
Embracing superior responsibility could serve that purpose by
holding the individual decision makers and puppet masters
responsible for their part in the human rights violations. Whether
one agrees or disagrees with the idea of corporate ATS liability, there
is little doubt that the courts can and should hold individuals
complicit in international crimes liable.
Many multinational corporations have holdings exceeding the
gross domestic products (GDPs) of most low- and medium-income
countries and thus carry more influence than the states that attempt
to govern them. The international community has therefore
progressed towards holding corporations accountable under
international law.23  Especially in poor developing countries and
countries that rely heavily on resource extraction, corporations often
have the leverage to exert a disproportionate amount of influence
over the political, legal, and social climate. If used with care and good
intentions, that influence can spur economic and legal development
along with positive social change. Unfortunately, when used with
impunity by corporate officers in the pursuit of profit without regard
for external consequences, that influence can lead to horrific
outcomes. In that way, corporations and the individuals running
corporations often find themselves complicit in and responsible for
stringent "knew or consciously disregarded" mens rea standard for superior
responsibility.
22. Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang, Criminal Liability for the
Actions of Subordinates--the Doctrine of Command Responsibility and Its Analogues
in United States Law, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 272, 290-91 (1997).
23. Miriam Saage-MaaB & Wiebke Golombek, Transnationality in Court: In Re
South African Apartheid Litigation, 02-MDL-1499, U.S. District Court, Southern
District of New York (Manhattan), April 8, 2009, 2 EUR. J. TRANSNAT'L STUD. 5, 12
(2010).
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gruesome crimes. As the rest of the world moves towards holding
corporate actors accountable for crimes, the United States should not
and cannot shy away by providing protection for illegal behavior.
As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Park,
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible
corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps
onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a right
to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in
business enterprises whose services and products affect the health
and well-being of the public that supports them.24
Importantly, regardless of whether they are influenced by the
corporate culture or inundated by the corporate structure, individual
people are the ones making decisions and taking actions on behalf of
the company. In that respect, superiors are not just potential targets
for human rights litigation; they are the right targets.25 Individuals
make judgment calls on where to drill and how to drill, where to
invest and how to invest, who to hire, and how to manage
relationships with partners and subsidiaries. Within the role of the
superior lies the authority and duty to control and oversee those
working beneath. Superiors do not only make decisions for
themselves; they also make choices that dictate the actions and
behavior of their subordinates. Corporations are run by warm-
blooded people, capable of making responsible and lawful decisions,
and culpable when they decide not to.
Moreover, when reasonable, the law attempts to shift the burden
of restitution onto those most able to handle that burden. The
Supreme Court noted in United States v. Dotterweich that when faced
with balancing relative hardships, "Congress has preferred to place it
upon those who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves
of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of
consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the
hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless."26 In the
human rights context, if victims cannot otherwise achieve justice or
24. 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) (citing Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the
Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731,741-45 (1960)).
25. Just to be clear, this is not to say that superiors are the only "right" targets for
culpability and liability.
26. 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943). Dotterweich concerned a strict liability responsible
corporate officer case under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 21 U.S.C. §§
301-392 (1938).
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compensation for their losses, the burden of restitution should fall on
those who could have and should have prevented their subordinates
from committing those crimes in the first place. Moreover, the
corporate officers who failed to prevent the crimes, especially those
with high-ranking jobs in multinational enterprises, often have
enough personal wealth or insurance to satisfy a monetary judgment.
As will be demonstrated in Part V, superior responsibility only
applies in a very narrow set of circumstances and provides corporate
officers with ample guidance to ensure compliance with the law.
Notwithstanding its narrow application, the use of the doctrine of
superior responsibility in ATS cases could serve as an effective
deterrent against reckless corporate behavior and foster more vigilant
investigation and repression of human rights violations.
III. Basic Principles of Superior Responsibility
A. Emergence of the Doctrine After World War II
While no explicit statutes including superior responsibility
provisions existed at the time of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals,
the basic principles of the current doctrine trace back to World War
II military court cases.27 The Tribunals faced cases against blatantly
culpable superiors but had no concrete evidence that the superior had
either ordered his soldiers or subordinates to commit atrocities, or
that the superior had shared his soldiers' intent to commit specific
crimes.28 Out of this need arose a doctrine of attributive liability, in
which superiors could be held liable for their role in directing or
controlling the commission of atrocities without charging them for the
crimes themselves.2 9
The trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, while not
representative of the current doctrine, represents the most famous
and perhaps the most far-reaching example of superior
27. See W.J. Fenrick, Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions
Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 103, 110 n.21 (1995) and Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility
of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J. INT'L
L. 89, 142 (2000). For a more complete history of the development of the doctrine,
see L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (1995).
28. Wu & Kang, supra note 22.
29. Id.
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responsibility.30 Despite the complete lack of concrete evidence that
General Yamashita ordered his troops to commit horrific crimes
against the native Filipino population and American prisoners,31 the
commission found Yamashita guilty of war crimes under a theory of
superior responsibility.32 The commission wrote that the soldiers'
crimes were so "extensive and widespread, both as to time and area,
that they must either have been willfully permitted by the accused, or
secretly ordered by the accused."33 In finding Yamashita guilty, the
commission stated that where "there is no effective attempt by a
commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a
commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the
lawless acts of his troops." 34 The Supreme Court of the United States
later denied Yamashita's writ of habeas corpus in what some saw as
an early domestic endorsement of the doctrine of superior
responsibility.3 ' The developing theory that arose from this case
allowed courts to infer culpability from an outcome and avoid the
evidentiary black holes inherent in requiring victims to provide
concrete evidence that individual commanders ordered the
perpetration of specific crimes.
B. Widespread Use Internationally and Domestically Post- World
War II
After formal codification of the doctrine of superior liability in
the Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,36 the
theory played a prominent role in the prosecution of war criminals in
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR)." The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary
30. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 4 LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1948).
31. Id. at 18-23.
32. Id. at 13-18.
33. Id. at 34.
34. Id. at 35.
35. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). Others saw the Supreme Court's
denial of Yamashita's writ of habeas corpus as simply reaffirming the Tokyo
Tribunal's jurisdiction to adjudicate. See Bruce D. Landrum, The Yamashita War
Crimes Trial: Command Responsibility Then and Now, 149 MIL. L. REV. 29 (1995).
36. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for
signatures Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 42-43.
37. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7 T
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Chambers of Cambodia, among others, have also applied the
principle." Through repeated and descriptive usage in the ICTY and
ICTR, superior responsibility has become a developed and refined
principle of international law. The ICTY's opinion in Prosecutor v.
Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo
(hereinafter Celibici) is widely recognized as the seminal superior
responsibility case in that it uprooted any notions that superior
responsibility only applied to military commanders in wartime." As
the first elucidation of command responsibility since the WWII
Tribunals, the opinion provides a thorough discussion of the legal
development of the doctrine in its analysis of Article 7(3) of the ICTY
statute, which is substantively identical to the ICTR's statute related
to superior responsibility.40 The Eleventh Circuit adopted the ICTY's
standards from Celibici in Ford v. Garcia, and other district courts
have relied heavily on ad hoc jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR
in numerous cases in the United States.41
C. Application During Peacetime
While the cases and statutes mentioned supra involve crimes in
war or war-like contexts, the Ninth Circuit noted in Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos that the United States has moved toward recognizing similar
"'command responsibility' for torture that occurs in peacetime,
perhaps because the goal of international law regarding the treatment
of noncombatants in wartime - 'to protect civilian populations and
3, May 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; see also Statute of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6 $ 3, Nov. 8 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
38. Article 6(3) Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Aug. 14, 2000
[hereinafter SCSL Statute]; Article 29 Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the courts of Cambodia for the prosecution of crimes
committed during the period of democratic Kampuchea, Oct. 27, 2004.
39. Prosecutor v. Delalic Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, (ICTY
Nov. 16, 1998), on appeal, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (ICTY
Feb. 20, 2001) http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgement/partl.htm
[hereinafter Celebici case]; see also ICTY Statute, supra note 27, art. 7, 1; ICTR
Statute, supra note 27, art. 6, 1.
40. Celebici, Appeals Chamber Judgment.
41. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ford, 289 F.3d 1283 (stating that
under international law, responsibility for torture, summary execution, or
disappearances extends further than the person who actually commits the acts, and
also includes anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated, or knowingly
ignored those acts); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996); Doe
v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1328-31 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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prisoners... from brutality' - is similar to the goal of international
human-rights law."'42
The ICTY echoed this sentiment, holding that the basis of the
superior's responsibility lies in his or her obligations as superior to
subordinates, and not in the "particular theatre in which the act was
committed." 3  The shift away from a strictly wartime doctrine
broadens the range of superior responsibility and further supports the
use of superior responsibility against corporate officers, who often
operate in areas void of recognized conflict.
D. Application to Civilians
Dating back to its first usage in post-World War II cases up
through the present, courts and tribunals have applied the doctrine of
superior responsibility to civilians. The Tokyo Tribunals, for
example, found the Japanese diplomat Koki Hirota guilty under a
theory of superior responsibility for the violent crimes and rapes by
Japanese troops near the Embassy in Nanking.44 As foreign minister,
Hirota knew of these crimes but relied on an assurance by the War
Ministry that the problem would be corrected and never again
reported or tried to prevent the heinous murders and violations of
women, despite ongoing reports of such incidents to his office.45
Regardless of his status as a civilian and lack of any formal authority
over the soldiers committing the crimes, the Tribunal found Hirota
guilty based on superior responsibility and sentenced him to death.4 6
Similarly, a French military tribunal tried German steel industry
executive Hermann Roechling for tolerating the use of forced labor at
his plants, and the mistreatment of such workers, who were supplied
by the German armed forces.47 The tribunal found Roechling guilty
42. 103 F.3d at 777 (quoting In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 15).
43. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, 20 (ICTY July 16, 2003).
44. 20 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 49,
791 (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., 1981) [hereinafter Tokyo Trial
Transcript].
45. Id. at 49, 610-11, 791.
46. See Vetter, supra note 27, at 125-27 (arguing that under the new ICC statute
Hirota would likely escape a guilty verdict based on the more stringent standards for
control and knowledge).
47. Government Commissioner v. Roechling, 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10, APP. B 1061, 1125, 1134 (1950) [hereinafter Roechling].
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of permitting and supporting the torture and mistreatment of workers
by the SS even though the prosecution, similar to the Yamashita case,
had no concrete evidence showing that Roechling knew of or
48
consciously disregarded information related to the mistreatment.
Roechling had no de jure authority over the Gestapo who actually
mistreated the workers, but his influence as the executive of the steel
plant implied that he could have used his de facto authority to repress
the violations.49
Since the World War II tribunals, United States courts and
international tribunals all over the world have reaffirmed the
extension of the principle of superior responsibility to civilians in
nonmilitary positions of superior authority." Notably, in Doe v. Qi, a
federal district court held a former mayor of Beijing responsible
under superior responsibility for the crimes committed by Beijing
police officers, due to the mayor's support of a policy of targeting and
abusing victims of religious persecution." In a case with a corporate
link, the ICTR held that the director of Gisovu Tea Factory, a public
corporate enterprise, exercised du jure authority over its employees
who had committed serious human rights violations.52 As seen by the
diverging types of control exhibited in the Roechling and Qi cases,
and as discussed further in Part V(B), liability can attach to civilian
superiors who exercise either de jure or de facto control.
At present, that the doctrine of superior responsibility applies to
civilians under customary international law is undisputed. However,
in some cases the standard of liability for civilians is slightly different
than the standard applied to a military superior. For example, the
ICC Statute promulgated in 1998 clearly differentiates between
military and civilian superiors. Article 28(2) provides the following
civilian standard for superior responsibility:
48. Roechling attended several secret conferences with Goering and other Nazi
leaders, although he maintained that he did not know about the crimes. Id. at 1077.
See also Vetter, supra note 27, at 127-33 (arguing that under the new ICC statute the
facts in the Roechling case would not support a conviction based on the nexus
requirement in art. 28(2)(b) and the heightened knowledge standard of consciously
disregarded).
49. Celibici, Trial Chamber Judgment, $ 376.
50. See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. 95-1-T,
Judgment and Sentence, $1 209, 213-16 (ICTR May 21, 1999).
51. 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1328-31.
52. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence,
148 (ICTR Jan. 27, 2000).
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(2) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not
described in paragraph 1 (concerning military commanders only), a
superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces subordinates under
his or her effective command authority and control, or effective
authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her
failure to exercise control properly over such forces subordinates
where:
The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or
about to commit such crimes; and
The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior; and
The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation
and prosecution.13
The above codification adopted by the ICC makes an explicit
and intentional distinction between the standard for military
commanders and the standard for civilian commanders. To begin
with, the civilian standard adds the additional requirement under sub-
section 28(2)(b) that the crimes committed by the subordinates
concern "activities that were within the effective responsibility and
control of the superior." As discussed infra in Part V(C), this extra
requirement can considerably affect the scope elements in potential
cases against corporate officers. The language of the ICC statute also
alters the definition of effective control, discussed infra in Part IV(B).
Under the civilian standard, sanctioning power is broader than that of
the military commander in that it only requires the reporting of
crimes rather than actual punishment of the perpetrators. The
differences make practical sense. Military personnel in the field
occupy that role twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, causing
every action taken during that time to fall under the scope of their
duty and the control of their superiors. While the ICC Statute would
obviously not be binding on a United States court, it stands as an
influential authority of customary international law. 4 It remains to be
53. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art 28(b).
54. Following Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004), courts are
supposed to look to the international norm, not the precise fact pattern from which
the norm emerged.
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seen how a United States court, in determining the elements of the
doctrine with respect to a corporate officer under the ATS, would
balance the weight of the ICC statute with the wealth of
distinguishable international case law.
IV. Choice of Law
A civil case built on superior responsibility could arise in United
States courts out of one of two statutes. If the facts involve torture,
the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) expressly provides a
cause of action in federal court. While the ATS is strictly
jurisdictional, the TVPA creates a substantive cause of action and
provides detailed definitions of what actions fall under the act."
Accordingly, human rights lawyers prefer to file suit under the TVPA
whenever possible, and the same will undoubtedly be true for cases
alleging liability for superior responsibility." In the legislative history
of the TVPA, the Senate expressly recognized responsibility for
"anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated or
knowingly ignored those acts . . . "" Furthermore, the Senate Report
refers to In Re Yamashita, in which the court held the commander
responsible for war crimes which "he knew or should have known ...
were going on but failed to prevent or punish them."" As the district
court noted in Doe v. Qi, the "Senate thus implicitly endorsed the
application of command responsibility to acts of torture and
extrajudicial killings whether committed by military or civilian
forces." 9 The Qi court also noted that "the text of the TVPA does
not limit its applicability to acts of military officials or the context of
55. There are two bases for standing under the Torture Victims Protection Act
(TVPA): (1) where the plaintiff is a direct victim of the alleged torture, and (2) where
the plaintiff brings a claim on behalf of a deceased tortured victim. Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 §§ 2 and 3(b)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Not all police brutality nor
every instance of excessive force used against prisoners, is torture under the TVPA;
rather the term is usually reserved for extreme, deliberate and unusually cruel
practices, for example, sustained systematic beating, application of electric currents
to sensitive parts of the body, and tying up or hanging in positions that cause extreme
pain.
56. For a more detailed comparison between the ATS and the TVPA, see
Ekaterina Apostolova, The Relationship Between the Alien Tort Statute and the
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 640, 641 (2010).
57. Hilao, 103 F.3d 777 (quoting S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 9).
58. Id.
59. 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-31.
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war."o Thus, for complaints alleging torture directly at the hands of a
superior's subordinates, the TVPA stands as a solid statutory basis to
assert a claim against a corporate officer on superior responsibility
grounds.
For cases involving crimes other than torture, or as a pleading
option in the alternative to the TVPA, a suit can be brought under
the ATS in federal court. As previously mentioned, the ATS states
that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."" The ATS, unlike the
TVPA, does not provide a cause of action, but provides grounds for
federal subject matter jurisdiction to recognize a right of action for a
very limited type of international law claim. The Supreme Court, in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Maichain, defined those claims as those that "rest on
a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with the specificity comparable to the features of the
eighteenth-century paradigms" of violation of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.62 While new
claims could emerge as customary international law evolves, current
claims under the ATS usually involve genocide, torture, or
extrajudicial killings.
Before addressing the substantive issues of applying superior
responsibility to corporate directors under the ATS, it is important to
touch on the choice of law debate that continually arises in similar
ATS cases. First, choice of law issues will unquestionably arise at the
initial stage of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction over a
superior responsibility claim. As noted previously, under the doctrine
of superior responsibility, superiors are not charged with the crimes
of their subordinates but rather with the failure to carry out their duty
to prevent or punish the criminal conduct. Under this theory of
liability, charges against the superior will almost never include direct
perpetration of genocide, torture, or the exploitation of forced-labor.
This begs the question: does the crime of failing to carry out a duty to
prevent or punish a subordinate's violation of the law of nations
constitute in and of itself a violation of the law of nations? As
articulated by the Supreme Court in Sosa: ". . . [Flederal courts
should not recognize claims under federal common law for violations
60. Id.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
62. 542 U.S. at 725, 729-30.
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of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the 18th-century paradigms
familiar when § 1350 (the Alien Tort Statute) was enacted.",3 Even if
the crimes committed by subordinates satisfy the Sosa requirement,
one might still have to claim that the stand-alone crime of failing to
prevent subordinates from committing atrocities as a civilian superior
violates an international law norm with a comparable specificity and
acceptance as piracy or an assault on a diplomat carried in 1789.
A similar issue arises in aiding and abetting cases, wherein
defendants often argue that a party's contributory conduct might
allow for or support a violation of the law of nations but does not
constitute a violation of the law of nations in and of itself. Scholars
and practitioners have hotly debated the topic.6 At any rate,
significant disparities exist between aiding and abetting and superior
responsibility in this regard, due to the nature of participation.
Because superior responsibility does not require any direct
participation or affirmative act by the defendant, it might seem a
stretch to establish jurisdiction based on the underlying violation.
Even more so than aiding and abetting, which punishes practical
assistance, encouragement, or moral support that has a substantial
effect on the perpetration of human rights violations, superior
responsibility is a breach unto itself because it primarily punishes the
lack of affirmative action. Under such reasoning, plaintiffs would
have to establish that failing to prevent atrocities by a superior is
intrinsically a violation of the law of nations. Due to the narrow
standards set by Sosa, that might be a difficult burden to overcome in
order to establish subject matter jurisdiction against corporate
officers.
Nonetheless, the unwavering international jurisprudence
regarding superior responsibility since the World War II Tribunals
lends credence to the argument that norms of civilian superior
responsibility meet the Sosa standards. Crimes based on the doctrine
of superior responsibility have been tried consistently under evolving
yet definite standards for over seventy years in every international
63. Id. at 694.
64. See Keitner, supra note 8; see, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, Taking Tort Law
Seriously in the Alien Tort Statute, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 871 (2008); Paul L. Hoffman
& Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and Aiding and
Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 47;
Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931 (2010).
17
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
criminal court faced with the issue.
Second, with little to no guidance from the Supreme Court,
judges have struggled to determine the source of substantive law
under the ATS in order to adjudicate the merits of a case.
Essentially, courts have yet to resolve whether domestic federal
common law or customary international law establishes the rule of
decision and substantive standards of liability.' Beyond the
complexity of litigating cases amidst a looming uncertainty over
choice of law, plaintiffs potentially face a lose-lose situation in which
the adoption of either standard would create substantial practical
problems.
On the one hand, plaintiffs could argue that a violation of
international law took place, but that because international law does
not itself provide a civil cause of action, the defendant should be tied
to that violation through domestic law. In that scenario, however,
plaintiffs would undoubtedly run into credible arguments that the
application of federal common law to foreign parties for violations on
foreign territory would constitute an impermissible extraterritorial
application of United States law,6 7 especially when the domestic
standards do not align with customary international law standards.68
Moreover, while a handful of United States courts have applied
superior responsibility, they have all done so on the basis of
customary international law. In Ford," for example, the court
adopted the superior responsibility standard used by the ICTY. As
65. In Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), for
example, all three Second Circuit judges gave differing interpretations on the
applicable source of substantive law. In Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir.
2002), the case settled before an en banc review had the chance to clarify the issue.
Due to the lack of consensus across circuit courts, or even within circuits, the
Supreme Court will likely address the issue with the next ATS case before it.
66. Professor Wuerth suggests a third approach that relies solely on federal
common law to govern the cause of action and the rule of decision. See Wuerth,
supra note 64. A much less developed view would also look at the general principles
of law as described in Article 38 of the Charter for the International Court of Justice
- this line of argument has not been fleshed out in ATS cases and is therefore
complicated and undetermined but it would allow you to look at domestic laws of
other nations to see what principles are widely shared.
67. However, if the superior was based in the United States and the relevant
conduct took place in the United States, then the violation actually occurred in the
U.S. even though the harm occurs abroad.
68. See William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Fallacy, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 35 (2010).
69. 289 F.3d 1283.
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such, it remains unclear what standards a United States court would
apply as federal common law for superior responsibility.
On the other hand, one could argue for the application of
customary international law across the board, similar to the use of
foreign norms as the controlling law in some United States cases. But
the absence of tort within customary international law complicates
ATS cases attempting to convert international criminal law standards
and norms into a civil cause of action in tort. Those who oppose
relying on customary international law argue that while international
criminal law prohibits certain conduct, it provides no civil cause of
action or civil redress for victims of international crimes. As such, the
argument follows that a plaintiff should not be able to import a
domestic remedy into an international violation for the sake of
personal preference.
This Article does not try to add fuel to either fire by arguing for
one approach or the other. Instead, it recognizes that a vast amount
of literature exists discussing the merits and complications of both
approaches in the context of aiding and abetting liability. For the
purposes of superior responsibility, the threshold ATS questions
debated within the courts and the academic community are the same
as those confronting aiding and abetting litigation. However, unlike
aiding and abetting, both international and United States courts have
applied similar standards for superior responsibility." The absence of
stark disparities makes the analysis of the elements simpler for the
purposes of this Article, allowing a more general review of both
customary international law and federal common law related to
superior responsibility. When a potential difference between the
standards arises, this Article discusses the ramifications of the
adoption of one approach over another.
V. Elements of Corporate Officer Superior Responsibility
The following analysis describes the essential elements of
superior responsibility as applied to corporate officers under the
ATS. Using case law from international tribunals and domestic
courts, each section explains the specific requirements and obstacles
70. This is due to the strong reliance of customary international law by United
States courts in any application of the doctrine of superior responsibility. However,
the adoption of a slightly modified standard for civilians recently by the ICC, a
persuasive source of customary international law, could muddle the waters. See
supra Part 2(D).
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for plaintiffs and practitioners, noting matters that might lead to
different results or standards if the court decides to apply the ICC
statute's standards.
A. Duty
Since a court must derive the superior's liability from his or her
subordinates' illegal act, a duty must exist to convert an omission, the
failure to prevent or punish, into an actus reus of the crime." Under
international law, superiors have such an "affirmative duty" to
prevent wrongdoings or punish those responsible for wrongful acts.72
Due to the doctrine's origins in military law, some might ask, should a
civilian corporate officer have the same or similar affirmative duties
of responsibility to victims of human rights violations by his
subordinates as a military commander? The better question, perhaps:
if a corporate officer has a sufficient level of control over his or her
subordinates, why shouldn't that vest a similar affirmative duty to
prevent human rights violations? Civilians in positions of power and
authority voluntarily assume those positions and often receive
handsome compensation for doing so." From that voluntary
assumption of authority comes a presumption of knowing
acquiescence to the correlated international law duties inherent in the
control over subordinates."
Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang justify the
imposition of this duty, stating, "From a regulatory standpoint, it is
often a military or civil leader who is the only, or at least best-
situated, person to prevent the commission of atrocities-society's
last line of defense. Under this analysis, the burden of the duty must
be placed where it will make a difference." Since superior
responsibility does not apply per se to any and all superiors in the
chain of command under a theory of strict liability, exclamations that
the burden on corporate officers would be unfair are exaggerated. As
detailed infra, civilians only have a duty to "take measures within
their power" over subordinates under their control to prevent the
71. Wu & Kang, supra note 22, at 290.
72. See, e.g., Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 242 (stating that commanders must take
appropriate measures to control troops for the prevention of such atrocities).
73. Wu & Kang, supra note 22, at 290.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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abuses or notify the authorities.76 The law does not require heroism,
only vigilance.
B. Control
The superior's duty, as explained above, arises out of his or her
control as a senior superior over the subordinate." Liability can only
be attached if the superior has de jure or de facto control over the
subordinate committing the initial crime." In a case where the
corporate officer has de jure authority (i.e., the perpetrator is an
employee or otherwise formally under the corporate officer's
command), the burden of proof switches to the defendant, and "the
Court may presume that possession of such power prima facie results
in effective control unless proof to the contrary is produced."79 Thus,
if a corporate officer were tied to the aiding and abetting violations of
a subordinate corporate employee, the defense would have the
burden to show that the superior did not have effective control over
the subordinate. Effective control exists when the civilian superior
has the material ability to either repress or prevent the commission of
the offense or, through his or her position in the hierarchy, report the
crimes and that in light of his or her position there is a likelihood that
those reports will trigger an investigation or initiate disciplinary or
criminal measures.' Notably, beyond the establishment of control,
76. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
77. Celebici, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 303 ("The Appeals Chamber
understands the necessity to prove that the perpetrator was the 'subordinate' of the
accused, not to import a requirement of direct or formal subordination but to mean
the relevant accused is, by virtue of his or her position, senior in some sort of formal
or informal hierarchy to the perpetrator.").
78. Wu & Kang, supra note 22, at 292.
79. Ford, 289 F.3d at 1291 (citing Celebici, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 197).
80. ICJ REPORT, supra note 17, at 34 (citing Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No.
ICTY IT-99-36-T, 1 281, Trial Chamber Judgment (Sep. 1, 2004)). The same kind of
logic is central to finding a duty in the Responsible Corporate Officer (RCO) context
for strict liability criminal claims against corporate officers for violations of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act: a duty
is imposed upon those who "had, by reason of [their] position ... responsibility and
authority either to prevent . . . or promptly to correct the violation complained of."
However, as Wu and Kang suggest, the imposition of strict liability for the types of
crimes applicable to ATS suit would be unreasonable. First, crimes such as genocide
and torture do not fit the mold of strict liability crimes, which attach liability
regardless of culpability or knowledge. Second, the difference in punishment is
significant as RCO crimes carry with them nominal fines and misdemeanor charges.
A case under the ATS could result in a multi-million dollar judgment and significant
harm to the superior's reputation. Wu & Kang, supra note 22, at 280-81, 292-93.
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the doctrine of superior responsibility does not require proof that a
superior's "behavior proximately caused the victim's injuries.",8
The concept of effective control is not limited to superior-
subordinate relationships in a military command-style structure or a
strict hierarchical paradigm."2 It follows that a corporate officer need
not have formal authority over the perpetrators of the underlying
violation to be held liable. 3 Neither the Japanese diplomat Koki
Hirota nor the German steel executive Hermann Roechling had legal
or formal authority over the soldiers committing the crimes, yet both
were held ultimately responsible because they had "sufficient"
authority.' A position of formal authority can often indicate or imply
a certain level of du jure control, but is not necessary in instances of
de facto control. Conversely, a demonstration of the general
influence of a superior alone without any real connection to the
criminal subordinate will usually not satisfy the requirement."
Whether derived from de jure or de facto control, legal
responsibility is not reserved for those superiors with the sole or
ultimate authority.' Any superior in the chain of command with
effective control over a subordinate can face liability based on that
subordinate's crimes. The district court in Doe v. Qi found the mayor
of Beijing liable for the arbitrary detention and torture of tens of
thousands of practitioners of Falun Gong, a religious minority,
despite the fact that he shared authority "collectively with others
through governing bodies."" The court added in footnote 47, "The
fact that command is shared by more than one official should not
81. Chavez, 559 F.3d at 499; see also Hilao, 103 F.3d at 773.
82. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. 97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, T 401
(ICTR May 15, 2003) (citing Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. 95-1A, Judgment,
56 (ICTR June 7, 2001)) (rejecting the notion that there must be a "de jure-like"
relationship).
83. See Prosecutor v. Kamuhamda, Case No. 99-54A-T, Trial Chamber Judgment
(ICTR Feb. 1, 2002).
84. Celibici, Trial Chamber Judgment, T 376 (describing sufficient authority as "a
term not normally used in relation to formal powers of command, but rather one
used to describe a degree of (informal) influence").
85. Id. 266, 303. In this regard consider the following RCO jury instruction:
"Second, it must be shown that the officer had direct responsibility for the activities
that are alleged to be illegal. Simply being an officer or even the president of a
corporation is not enough. The Government must prove that the person had a
responsibility to supervise the activities in question." United States v. MacDonald &
Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 50-51 (1st Cir. 1991).
86. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162,172 (D. Mass. 1995).
87. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
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obviate the doctrine of command responsibility per se, lest
responsibility could never be imputed to members of a governing
body which authorized human rights violations."m The existence of
such a principle plays a critical role in the use of superior
responsibility for corporate officers, who often govern by committee.
In discussing the control element, it seems prudent to
differentiate between cases linking high-ranking corporate officers to
the crimes of the initial violators of human rights, and cases linking
those corporate officers to the crimes of persons in the company who
aided and abetted the underlying crimes. While both types of
violations can implicate the superior, establishing effective control
and a superior-subordinate relationship is often easier in the former
scenario. In general, due to the implementation of protective or
intentionally detached corporate hierarchies, cases will become
increasingly difficult as the defendants hold higher-ranking positions
in a company. A suit against the President or CEO of a huge
multinational corporation for the criminal acts of security personnel
hired and directly supervised by a low-ranking manager in a foreign
subsidiary would involve a far more attenuated link of control than a
case against the manager who hired and directly interacted with the
security personnel. Plaintiffs will have to analyze that risk in
consideration of the fact that low- or mid-level corporate officers
might not have the personal means to satisfy a judgment, and might
not reside or have a presence in the territory of the United States for
personal jurisdiction purposes.
Inherent in the control requirement lies the caveat that if the
supervisor would have been or was powerless to prevent the
violation, no liability will attach. If there is nothing the superior could
have done to prevent or punish a crime, it seems unfairly onerous and
of little deterrent value to impose liability." Yet, while the duty
allows superiors to escape liability for failing to prevent the
inevitable, there are fairly stringent limits to what a superior can
claim as objectively impossible. In the Yamashita case, for example,
the defense argued that even if General Yamashita had been
explicitly notified of the atrocities being committed by his troops he
would have been powerless to swiftly prevent them. The court,
however, ruled that while a defendant might be powerless to prevent
future crimes at a certain time, the superior is still responsible if he or
88. Id. at 1334 n.47.
89. Wu & Kang, supra note 22, at 295.
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she allowed the situation to develop to an irreversible stage."
C. Scope
Even if a plaintiff can demonstrate the existence of a superior-
subordinate relationship with effective control, a superior defendant
is limited to liability for actions within the scope of that relationship.9'
The ICC statute expresses this principle in Article 28(2)(b), requiring
that "[t]he crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior."' The scope issue will
undoubtedly play a larger role in suits against corporate officers than
it has in past cases in international tribunals. First, cases against
military commanders rarely discuss scope, likely because under the
strict hierarchical nature of the military, very little that a soldier does
falls outside the scope of the military commander's duty.9' The same
could equally hold true for employees of private military and security
companies, which operate similarly. But what about local security
forces hired by a mining company to protect the mine? If those
security personnel rape and torture villagers in close proximity to the
mine, would that fall under the scope of the mining company
manager's control? Clearly, the facts will have to establish the
determination of scope in each case, but it should be noted that very
little guidance exists in prior superior responsibility cases.
90. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 23-29.
91. The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines conduct arising under the
scope of employment as "of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental
to the conduct authorized." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229(1) (1958).
As mentioned by Wu and Kang, the scope of employment requirement is a familiar
feature of the common law respondeat superior doctrine. The authors sensibly warn
that the similarity should not be overstated in that, unlike tort law, which creates
liability stemming solely out of the relationship, the consideration of the
relationship's scope is merely a factor in finding a duty in superior responsibility. Wu
& Kang, supra note 22, 294 n.113.
92. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 28(2)(b). This requirement is not found in
the military standard, noting that civilian superiors do not have the same kind of total
around-the-clock control over their employees as military commanders do over their
soldiers. Greg Verter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the
International Criminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 89, 120 (adding that since
courts rarely construe statutes as merely stating the obvious, one might argue that the
addition of the "crimes concerned activities" portion is an implicit embodiment of a
causation element.)
93. Wu & Kang, supra note 22, at 295.
24 [Vol. 35:1
2012] Applying the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility to Corporate Officers
D. Knowledge and Foreseeability
The knowledge standard represents the starkest divergence on
superior responsibility between the new ICC statute and the
standards utilized by the plethora of international tribunals and
United States courts applying the doctrine before the ICC. Under the
ICC, a civilian superior must have either known "or consciously
disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes."9 4 In
contrast, the ICTY, ICTR, and the United States cases adopted a
much broader standard that allows a finding of either actual or
constructive knowledge. Actual knowledge can be shown through
direct or circumstantial evidence.95 To establish constructive
knowledge, as the ICTY stated in Celibici:
[A] showing that a superior had some general information in his
possession, which would put him on notice of possible unlawful acts
by his subordinates would be sufficient to prove that he 'had reason
to know' [ ... ] This information does not need to provide specific
information about unlawful acts committed or about to be
committed. 9
The disparity between the standards is drastic. Under the ICC, a
plaintiff would have to overcome an elevated burden requiring (1)
proof of the possession of information clearly indicating that
subordinates had or were about to commit crimes; and (2) proof that
the corporate officer consciously disregarded that information.
Under the "knew or should have known standard," a
demonstration that prior knowledge fell within the accepted area of
responsibility of the superior can be imputed through less specific
circumstantial evidence. For example, the court can weigh factors
such as the superior's position in the company and the nature of that
position.97 If a superior regularly received reports or communications
from superiors with knowledge of the crimes or if the crimes were of
general knowledge due to media reports, the court could draw a
94. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 28(2)(a).
95. ICJ REPORT, supra note 17, at 33.
96. Celibici, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 1 238.
97. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 172 (finding that, as the Minister of Defense, "at a
minimum, [defendant] was aware of and supported widespread acts of brutality
committed by personnel under his command"); Semanza, ICTR-97-20-T, 404
(noting that an individual's position within a chain of command is a "significant"
factor in determining whether he had knowledge).
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determination that the superior had constructive knowledge.98
Under either standard, the courts will presume knowledge if the
superior deliberately refrained from obtaining available information,
or if he or she was so negligent about obtaining information "that
malicious intent can be inferred from the failure to do so."" If
coupled with the ICC's high burden, however, this caveat still allows
for corporate officers to escape liability through crafty hierarchical
structuring or operational practices that keep them isolated. The law
should not only punish blatant cases of willful blindness but should
encourage vigilance in actively avoiding such ignorance. Companies
with a high risk of complicity in human rights violations, such as
natural resource extraction and private security, have to act with a
high degree of professional diligence in assessing risk for a wide array
of factors in any business dealing. Companies evaluate and analyze
investments and operations comprehensively, to the point that
claiming ignorance serves as no excuse when evidence of human
rights violations, or the risk of human rights violations, stemming
from the company's involvement is objectively available. In this
sense, showing that the superior had some information in his or her
possession to "put him on notice of possible unlawful acts by his
subordinates" should be enough in every instance to prove that the
superior should have either immediately taken action to prevent or
punish those unlawful acts or, at the very least, initiated further
investigation.
In that vein, the Tokyo Tribunal required systematic measures as
opposed to direct supervision in a case against government leaders
relating to the management of prisoners of war. Recognizing the
complex system of delegated duties in a prison system, the Tribunal
held that the government officials failed in their duty to secure proper
treatment of the prisoners by (1) failing to establish a system that did
so; or (2) if having established such a system, by failing to secure the
continued and efficient working of said system. This approach in
effect states that delegation to a subordinate is no excuse when
98. Celibici, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 230 (noting a presumption of
knowledge based on reports and other means of communication, which would put
defendant on notice of the human rights abuses).
99. ICJ REPORT, supra note 17, at 33 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. 96-
4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1$ 479, 489 (ICTR Sept. 20, 1998)); Xuncax, 886 F.
Supp. at 172-74 (anyone with higher authority who "knowingly ignored" may also be
liable under command responsibility).
100. TOKYO TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 44, at 48, 444.
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reliance upon the subordinate is unreasonable.m' From a policy
standpoint, this makes perfect sense in the corporate context. The
CEO of a major oil company cannot be expected to control every
single person working for the company, but the law should still
discourage corporate officers from calculatedly keeping themselves in
the dark or promoting a "profit at all costs" business model. The
Tokyo Tribunal aimed to deter this by requiring a system that aims to
effectively protect the rights of others through risk analysis, reporting
requirements, and the prompt and careful handling of any reports or
information regarding connected human rights violations. Under the
ATS, individual officers should likewise be liable for their failure to
perform this duty. If a human rights violation takes place despite the
implementation of a system taking the above precautions, a high-
ranking officer would not be held liable unless he or she should have
reasonably known that such a system was faulty or intrinsically
ineffective.10
VI. Conclusion
From the above analysis, it is clear that superior responsibility
only fits as a theory of liability into a narrow set of cases. While the
theory can prove useful in those cases, it is far from a gap filler for
Kiobel should the Supreme Court uphold or follow the Second
Circuit's grant of ATS immunity for corporations. Still, when viewed
as an alternative or additional theory of liability to holding the
individual decision-makers responsible for their involvement in
human rights violations, superior responsibility could serve a key
function. By holding superiors civilly liable for irresponsibly or
intentionally failing to control or punish subordinates who violate
human rights, United States courts can allow victims to take legal
action against blameworthy individuals who were often in the best
position to prevent the violation and are often in the best position to
provide redress for the violation.
101. Wu & Kang, supra note 22, at 294-95.
102. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (1st ed. 1997)
("[Als a practical matter, the extension of culpability under command
responsibility raises special questions in the context of organizations without
rigid military hierarchies. Prosecutors will need to determine the chain of
command in the absence of clear rank or even formal decision-making
structures. Reliance will need to be placed on witness testimony and other
indicia of the customary practices observed within a particular group.").
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